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At the time of ratifying the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, South Africa made reservations and interpretative 
declarations. This article discusses the meaning and legal implications of those reserva-
tions and interpretative declarations.
1 INTRODUCTION
South Africa ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Protocol) on 17 December 
2004 and deposited its Instrument of Ratification with the Chairperson of 
the Commission of the African Union on 14 January 20051 as required by 
Article 28 of the Protocol. At the time of ratification South Africa made three 
reservations and two interpretative declarations to the Protocol. It made a 
reservation to Article 4(2)(j) which deals with the imposition of the death 
penalty on pregnant and nursing mothers; Article 6(d) which deals with the 
registration of customary marriages; and Article 6(h) on the nationality or 
citizenship of children born of alien parents. South Africa made interpretative 
declarations to Article 1(f) which defines ‘discrimination against women’ and 
Article 31 that deals with the question of whether the South African Con-
stitution (the Constitution) offers more favourable human rights protection 
than the Protocol. The purpose of this article is to discuss the meaning and 
legal implications of those reservations and interpretative declarations. The 
discussion is structured in the following order: the status of international law 
in South Africa is appraised; the drafting history of the Protocol follows; an 
outline of the articles in the Protocol is done (however, a detailed discussion 
of these rights falls outside the scope of this article but references are given 
on each provision for further reading by those interested in in-depth discus-
sions of individual provisions); this is followed by a detailed discussion of 
the meaning of reservations and interpretative declarations under interna-
tional law; South Africa’s reservations and interpretative declarations to the 
1 See http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20
of%20Women.pdf [accessed 18 August 2007].
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Protocol and their legal implications are analysed; lastly, conclusions and 
recommendations are made.
2  INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES: A SOUTH AFRICAN VIEW
The fact that the apartheid government was in a class of its own in violating 
human rights has been documented sufficiently in law reports, human rights 
reports, journal and newspaper articles, textbooks, Organisation of African 
Unity resolutions,2 and United Nations resolutions.3 With the demise of 
apartheid the democratic government adopted various measures to transform 
South Africa. Notable among these measures is the extent to which South 
Africa has signed, acceded to or ratified various regional and international 
human rights treaties. Dugard notes that “[b]efore 1994…South Africa was 
a party to only one instrument with human rights clauses – the Charter of 
the United Nations – and that was not incorporated into municipal law”.4 
The result was that “no direct effect could be given to articles 55 and 56 
of the Charter”5 which relate to human rights. However, since 1994 South 
Africa has signed or ratified various international and regional human rights 
instruments.6
What is the impact of international or regional human rights instruments 
on South Africa’s human rights jurisprudence? To answer this question one 
has to look at the Constitution and courts, and how they have treated the 
question of the status of international human rights treaties.
Another notable feature of the post-1994 era in South Africa was the enact-
ment of a new Constitution which has been described as: “one of the most 
advanced constitutions in history”,7 and also as “one of the best constitu-
tions in the world” with a Bill of Rights “which is considered among the most 
comprehensive of all Bills of Rights to date”.8 The Constitution unambigu-
ously provides in section 39(1)(b) that “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
a court, tribunal, or forum must consider international law”. Under section 
233, when interpreting any legislation, a court must ensure that it adopts an 
interpretation that is in line with South Africa’s international law obligations. 
Sections 231 and 232 are to the effect that customary international law and 
treaties are sources of law in South Africa. Dugard summarises the impact the 
new Constitution has had on the status of international law in South Africa:
“As a result of the new Constitution, it has now become common place for the Constitu-
tional Court and other courts to invoke human rights norms and decisions by international 
2 Dugard (2007) International Law: A South African Perspective 546-547.
3 Dugard rightly writes that “South Africa’s racial policies featured on the agenda of the General 
Assembly from 1946 to 1994.” See Dugard (fn 2 above) 311.
4 Dugard (fn 2 above) 336.
5 Dugard (fn 2 above) 336.
6 For the list of international treaties that South Africa had ratified or signed by 2007 see Dugard (fn 
2 above) 316-328; and for a list of regional human rights treaties South Africa had signed or ratified 
by 2007 see Dugard (fn 2 above) 556-568.
7 Dugger (2007) 197. 
8 Goodsell (2007) 109.
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human rights tribunals and supervisory bodies to interpret the Bill of Rights and to set 
aside laws and administrative practices that violate human rights. It is impossible to 
examine all the judicial decisions that have invoked international human rights law. The 
Annual Survey of South African Law and academic writings give some indication of the 
extent of this judicial practice.”9
Dugard reviews various judgments in which South African courts have referred 
to international treaties and to decisions of international and regional human 
rights bodies or tribunals. Courts have referred to treaties, such as the Con-
vention against Torture, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the jurisprudence developed 
by the relevant committees established to oversee the implementation of, 
and compliance with, the above treaties.10 Courts have also relied heavily on 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.11 Some pieces of 
legislation, like the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and Refugees Act of 1998, 
also require that their interpretation should reflect South Africa’s commitment 
to its international human rights obligations in the sense that they should be 
interpreted with due regard to, or in compliance with, the relevant interna-
tional law instruments.12 De Wet succinctly captures the ways through which 
international instruments are incorporated in the domestic legal system of 
South Africa in the following words: “[Non self-executing] treaties …only 
become part of South African law once they are ratified and incorporated by 
means of legislation. Self-executing treaties pose an exception in this regard, 
as they become automatically operational once ratified.”13 In addition, de 
Wet rightly reminds us, “[c]ustomary international law is automatically 
part of South African law, unless it is incompatible with the Constitution or 
national legislation”.14
3 THE PROTOCOL
The Protocol,15 which at the time of writing had been ratified or acceded to 
by 21 African countries,16 is the main instrument in which the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) could 
be said to have formulated and laid down principles and rules aimed at 
solving legal problems relating to women’s rights and freedoms, and upon 
which African governments may base their legislation that may in one way 
or another affect the rights of women, hence fulfilling its mandate under 
9 Dugard (fn 2 above) 338. Emphasis in the original. Footnotes omitted.
10 Dugard (fn 2 above) 339-340.
11 Dugard (fn 2 above) 339-340.
12 Dugard (fn 2 above) 340.
13 De Wet (2004 – 2005) 1532 – 1533.
14 De Wet (fn 13 above) 1533.
15 Adopted in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 25 November 2005.
16 The 21 African countries that had ratified this Protocol at the time of writing were: Benin; Burkina 
Faso; Cape Verde; Comoros; Djibouti; the Gambia; Libya; Lesotho; Mali; Malawi; Mozambique; 
Mauritania; Namibia; Nigeria; Rwanda; South Africa; Senegal; Seychelles; Tanzania; Togo; and 
Zambia. See <http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol%20on%20
the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf> [accessed 12 March 2008].
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article 45(1)(b) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.17 
The African Commission, especially the office of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (SRRWA), was very instrumental during 
the drafting, adoption and process of ratification of this Protocol, and it 
continues to call upon African countries that have not ratified this Protocol 
to do so urgently. I now turn to a brief discussion of the historical adoption 
process of the Protocol.
The process leading to the drafting of the Protocol began in the 1990s 
when, during several meetings and seminars, human rights activists pointed 
out that, to a large extent, the African Charter was lacking in its protection 
of the rights of women in Africa.18 At the insistence of various partners, 
the African Commission in 1998 appointed the SRRWA whose mandate 
included, amongst other things, to make a follow-up on the drafting of the 
Protocol until its adoption by the African Union.19 With the assistance of 
NGOs and a Working Group which was established for that purpose, a draft 
of the Protocol was presented to the 26th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission in November 1998 for adoption.20 In effect, it took the Work-
ing Group less than two years to come up with the draft of the Protocol. 
The African Commission adopted the Draft Protocol at its 26th Session and 
thereafter transmitted it to the OAU General Secretariat for the requisite 
process.21
As a result, the OAU General Secretariat convened two Meetings of 
Experts both in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss the Draft Protocol – the 
first was held from 12 – 16 November 2001 and the second from 24 -26 
March 2003. The Draft Protocol was discussed and adopted at the Ministe-
rial meeting which was held from 27-28 March 2003, also in Addis Ababa.22 
It was submitted for adoption and was adopted at the Second Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African 
Union at its Summit which took place from 10-12 July 2003 in Maputo, 
Mozambique.23
17 In the Inter-American system of human rights, unlike in the African, the major instrument on 
women’s rights is dedicated to the eradication of violence against women. See the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, “Conven-
tion of Belem do Para” adopted in Belém do Pará, Brazil, on 9 June 1994 at the 24th Regular Session 
of the General Assembly.
18 See 16th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ARAC) 
(2002-2003), para 55. For further discussion of the history of the Protocol see, Baderin MA, ‘Recent 
Developments in the African Regional Human Rights System’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 
117 at 118-124; and Nsibirwa MS ‘A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 40 at 
41-43.
19 16th ARAC, para 56.
20 16th ARAC, para 57.
21 16th ARAC, para 57.
22 16th ARAC, para 58.
23 16th ARAC, para 58. See also <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/Summits/summit.
htm> [accessed 12 October 2006].
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3.2 An outline of the rights in the Protocol
The Protocol provides various rights to women and these are: the right to 
freedom from discrimination;24 the right to dignity;25 the rights to life, integ-
rity and security of the person;26 the right not to be subjected to harmful 
practices;27 rights relating to marriage, separation, divorce and annulment 
of marriage;28 access to justice and equal protection before the law;29 right to 
participation in the political and decision-making process;30 right to peace;31 
rights of women in armed conflicts;32 right to education and training;33 
24 Article 2.
25 Article 3.
26 Article 4. For a discussion of the rights to human dignity and physical security, see Nsibirwa (fn 18 
above) 44. It has been rightly observed that ‘…the state is made responsible for violence including 
forced sex in the private sphere raising the possibility that those African states which have not 
already done so, may have to legislate to make rape within marriage illegal.’ See Banda (2006) 79.
27 Article 5. It has been observed that ‘[t]he most important contribution by the Draft OAU Convention 
to the Draft Women’s Protocol is to be found in article 6 which deals entirely with harmful practices. 
For practices to be harmful they must not only affect the fundamental human rights of women and 
girls but they must also be contrary to recognised international standards. This could be interpreted 
to mean that these standards are flexible, classifying certain activities as harmful.’ Nsibirwa (fn 18 
above) 45. Female genital mutilation or cutting is one of the harmful practices that the Protocol calls 
upon states to put to an end. For a discussion of the problem of female genital mutilation in Africa 
see: Friedenthal NJ ‘It’s Not All Mutilation: Distinguishing between Female Genital Mutilation and 
Female Circumcision’ (2006) 19 New York International Law Review 111 at 111-154; Wu EY ‘Global 
Burqas’ (2005) 14 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 179 at 179-199; For a detailed examination 
of how the community can be involved in eradicating female genital mutilation, see Ouoba D et 
al, Experience from a Community Based Education Program in Burkina Faso: The Tostan Program 
(2004) available at <http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/frontiers/FR_FinalReports/BurkinaFaso_FGC.
pdf> accessed 11 March 2008. It has been observed that ‘[t]he strength of the African Protocol is in 
its recognition that…the elimination of harmful practices, requires an holistic approach which goes 
beyond law and punishment to embrace the totality of the person whose rights have been violated.’ 
See Banda (fn 26 above) 80-81. In Kenya, for instance, an alternative rites approach which involves 
community members in addressing the problem of female genital mutilation instead of penal sanc-
tions has registered some achievements. See J Chege et al, An Assessment of an Alternative Rites 
Approach for Encouraging Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation in Kenya (2001) available at 
<http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/frontiers/FR_FinalReports/Kenya_FGC.pdf> [accessed 12 March 
2008]. 




32 Article 11. It was argued with reference to Article 11 in its draft form, that ‘article 4(d) of the Draft 
Protocol has brought about a more positive and welcome approach to the issue of treating rape and 
sexual abuse during conflict as war crimes. Such acts are to be considered war crimes without the 
prosecution having to prove that they were carried out with a political motive.’ See Nsibirwa (fn 18 
above) 45. For a detailed discussion of the obligation of the states parties to the Protocol to protect 
women from sexual violence, see Dyani (2006) 166-187. Apart from the Protocol, women in armed 
conflicts in Africa are also protected under the Four Geneva Conventions and the Two Additional 
Protocols, some of the provisions of which are believed to have acquired the status of customary 
international law. See generally, Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (2005); Jinks & Sloss (2004), 97, where 
it is argued that the Geneva Conventions have become part of customary international law (168). It 
has to be noted that almost all African countries are states parties to the Four Geneva Conventions 
and the Two Additional Protocols. See <http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/
IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf> [accessed 11 March 2008].
33 Article 12.
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economic and social welfare rights;34 health and reproductive health care 
rights;35 right to food security;36 right to adequate housing;37 right to posi-
tive cultural context;38 right to healthy and sustainable environment;39 right 
to sustainable development;40 widow’s rights;41 right to inheritance;42 the 
special protection of elderly women;43 special protection of women with 
disabilities;44 and special protection of women in distress.45 The Protocol 
also requires states parties to provide remedies to women whose rights have 
been violated.46
4  RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE 
DECLARATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
4.1 Reservations
Unlike other treaties that specifically allow states to make reservations to 
some of their provisions at the time of ratification,47 the Protocol is silent 
on reservations. However, that does not mean that reservations cannot be 
made to it. Baderin has argued that the fact that the Protocol is silent on 
reservations “in essence means that reservations are possible subject to the 
relevant international law rules in that regard”.48 He adds that, by allowing 
reservations, a treaty may get as many State Parties as possible but that at the 
34 Article 13. It has been argued that the inclusion of pornography as a form of exploitation and abuse 
of women indicates the unique character of the Protocol on the ground that it moves away from 
the Western debates ‘…about whether pornography constitutes a violation of women’s rights or is 
covered under the right to free speech…’ See Banda (fn 26 above) 80.
35 Article 14. While analyzing article 14, Banda poses a question that needs an objective approach: 
“…one must ask how many women would dare ask a husband or partner about his HIV status?” 
She goes on to observe objectively that “[f]ear of rejection or violence for daring to challenge the 
breadwinner and head of the household means that this provision will have to be read with Article 
2(2) on the changing attitudes and challenging stereotypes”. See Banda (fn 26 above) 81-82. It has 
been observed that “[m]any of Africa’s problems may be attributed to its high rate of population 
growth. Giving women greater control over reproduction will not only ensure women better health 
but also help the continent to tackle the problem of rapid population growth”. See Nsibirwa (fn 
18 above) 48-49. It has been rightly observed that Article 14(2)(c) is controversial and, that its 
prospects of enforcement remain debatable, but that, that notwithstanding, “…it is worth noting that 
this provision constitutes the first time in international human rights law that a right to abortion has 






41 Article 20. It has been rightly observed that ‘[l]ikened to widow disinheritance is widow abuse which 
can include being made to sleep with a stranger to be “cleansed” or indeed being forced to marry 
one of the deceased’s relatives. The Protocol makes it clear that the widow is not to be subject to 
degrading and inhuman treatment…a widow shall have the right to remarry if she so wishes (and 






47 For example Article 28 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW); Article 51 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and Article 30 of the 
Convention against Torture.
48 Baderin (fn 18 above) 123.
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same time many reservations may weaken the “universal normative force of 
a treaty”.49 At the time of writing three countries had made reservations to the 
Protocol – South Africa, The Gambia and Namibia.50 There are some treaties 
that prohibit reservations.51 The Protocol is not one of them. It has been sug-
gested that the absence of a provision in the Protocol prohibiting reservations 
“is probably a double-edged sword designed to both encourage participation 
and accommodate, among State Parties, possible cultural-legal differences 
that do not destroy the object and purpose of the treaty”.52 We now turn to a 
discussion of the law relating to reservations.
According to Article 1(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties (VCLT), a reservation “means a unilateral statement, however phrased 
or named, made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”. 
Article 23 of the VCLT requires that a reservation “must be formulated in 
writing”. States do not have unlimited discretion when they opt to make res-
ervations to certain provisions of the treaty. In terms of Article 19 of the VCLT, 
States are not allowed to enter reservations that are prohibited by the treaty; 
and reservations should not be incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the treaty. When states make reservations that are considered by other states 
to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, the latter are 
allowed by Article 20 of the VCLT to, and usually do, object to such reserva-
tions. For example, while acceding to CEDAW, Libya made a reservation to 
Article 253 to the effect that “Article 2 of the Convention shall be implemented 
with due regard for the peremptory norms of the Islamic Shariah relating to 
determination of the inheritance portions of the estate of a deceased person, 
49 Baderin (fn 18 above) 123.
50 See http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/themes/theme39.html accessed 11 March 2008.
51 See Article 2(1) of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.
52 Baderin (fn 18 above) 124.
53 Article 2 of CEDAW states: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, 
agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy eliminating discrimination 
against women and, to this end, undertake:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality between men and women in their national constitutions or 
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other 
appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohib-
iting all discrimination against women;
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure 
through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women 
against any act of discrimination;
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that 
public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organi-
zation or enterprise.
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regula-
tions, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women”.
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whether female or male”.54 On 8 June 1990 Finland objected to that reserva-
tion in the following terms:
“The Government of Finland has examined the contents of the reservation made by the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and considers the said reservation as being incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention. The Government of Finland therefore enters 
its formal objection to this reservation.”55
On 16 October 1996 Finland gave its detailed explanation why it thought the 
reservation by Libya to Article 2 of CEDAW was incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention:
“A reservation which consists of a general reference to religious law without specifying its 
contents does not clearly define to the other Parties of the Convention the extent to which 
the reserving State commits itself to the Convention and therefore may cast doubts about 
the commitment of the reserving State to fulfil its obligations under the Convention. Such 
a reservation is also, in the view of the Government of Finland, subject to the general 
principle of the observance of treaties according to which a Party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty”.56
When a State Party objects to a reservation by another State Party, it usually 
also states the legal implications of such objection on the implementation of 
the treaty between the reserving and the objecting state.57 For example, after 
making the above objection to Libya’s reservations, Finland expressly put 
it that “[t]his objection is not an obstacle to the entry into force of the said 
Convention between Finland and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”. It is common 
practice that, when states object to reservations by other states, they add that 
they do not object to the entry into force of the relevant treaty in its entirety 
between the reserving and objecting states, with the understanding, however, 
that the reserving states shall not benefit from the reservations. There are 
instances where objecting states recommend to the reserving states what to 
do in cases of what the former consider to be reservations incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty. For example, when ratifying CEDAW 
Niger made many reservations that Denmark considered to be incompat-
ible with the Convention. In its objections Denmark, while observing that 
CEDAW remained “in force in its entirety between Niger and Denmark”, rec-
ommended to “the Government of Niger to reconsider its reservations…”58
Article 22 of the VCLT allows states to withdraw reservations “at any time”. 
The government of Malawi, for example, when acceding to CEDAW, made 
two reservations which it withdrew later. The following Statement from the 
UN Secretary General’s Office regarding that development is noted:
“On 24 October 1991, the Government of Malawi notified the Secretary-General of its 
decision to withdraw the following reservations made upon accession:
  ‘Owing to the deep-rooted nature of some traditional customs and practices of 
Malawians, the Government of the Republic of Malawi shall not, for the time being, 
consider itself bound by such of the provisions of the Convention as require immediate 
eradication of such traditional customs and practices.
54 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
55 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
56 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
57 For the legal effects of reservations and objections to reservations, see Article 21 of the VCLT.
58 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
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While the Government of the Republic of Malawi accepts the principles of article 29, 
paragraph 2 of the Convention this acceptance should nonetheless be read in conjunc-
tion with [its] declaration of 12th December 1966, concerning the recognition, by the 
Government of the Republic of Malawi, as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Justice [sic] under article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Court’.”59
As at March 2008, the following countries had withdrawn all or some of the 
reservations that they had made to CEDAW: Czechoslovakia, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bangladesh, USSR (Russia), Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Fiji, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and the 
United Kingdom.60 The VCLT, while allowing States Parties to a treaty to 
modify a treaty61does not expressly allow or prohibit states to modify reserva-
tions. Instances have arisen where a state’s reservations have been objected 
to by many State Parties to the treaty, but at the same time such state does 
not want to withdraw its reservations. What some states do, is to modify their 
reservations. States have reacted to such modifications in at least two ways: 
either by objecting to the content of the modified reservations or by rejecting 
the modified reservations in their entirety, and calling upon the modifying 
state to withdraw the reservations and not just to modify them. For example, 
when on 6 February 1998 Malaysia notified the UN Secretary General that 
it had modified its reservation to CEDAW, France (on 20 July 1998) objected 
to the modified reservation on the ground that it was incompatible with the 
object and purpose of CEDAW. But the Netherlands (on 21 July 1998), after 
examining Malaysia’s modification, urged Malaysia to strive to respect the 
rights implicated in its modified reservation and also change its relevant laws 
in conformity with CEDAW.62
When Maldives modified its reservation to CEDAW, Finland “examined the 
contents of the modified reservation” and welcomed the modifications “with 
satisfaction”; although some elements of the modified reservation remained 
“objectionable”, and assumed that Maldives would “do its utmost to bring its 
national legislation into compliance with obligations under the Convention 
with a view to withdrawing the reservation”. However, Germany categorically 
objected to the modification on the ground that it was a violation of Article 
19 of the VCLT:
“The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany notes that reservations to treaties 
can only be made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding 
to a treaty (article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). After a State has 
bound itself to a treaty under international law it can no longer submit new reservations 
or extend or add to old reservations. It is only possible to totally or partially withdraw 
original reservations, something unfortunately not done by the Government of the 
Republic of the Maldives with its modification. The Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany objects to the modification of the reservations.”63
59 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
60 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
61 Article 41.
62 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
63 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
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The above discussion is relevant to South Africa in relation to its reservations 
to the Protocol and to other treaties in at least four respects: one is that every 
reservation South Africa intends to enter on a treaty provision should be as 
clear as possible; two, such a reservation should not defeat the object and 
purport of the treaty otherwise it will be invalid and will attract an avalanche 
of objections; three, South African is free to withdraw any reservation to any 
treaty provision at any time; and four, should any state party to the Proto-
col object to any of South Africa’s reservation, South Africa could choose to 
either retain the reservation, modify it or withdraw it competently. However, 
it is recommended that it would be better for South Africa to withdraw a res-
ervation instead of modifying it because, as the above objection by Germany 
to Maldives’ modification illustrates, the VCLT only allows a reservation at 
the time when the state is becoming party to the treaty and not when it has 
already become party to the treaty. Modifying a reservation is tantamount to 
entering a new reservation after becoming party to the treaty, a situation not 
contemplated under the VCLT.
4.2 Interpretative declarations
Unlike reservations, the VCLT does not expressly provide for, or define, 
interpretative declarations. In 1957 Fitzmaurice made the following observa-
tion in relation to interpretative declarations and reservations that is still of 
relevance today:
“[G]overnments not infrequently [make] declarations in which they do not say that they 
will not carry out, or will only partly carry out, a certain provision – but make statements 
of intention, or say how they understand or propose to interpret or apply the provision, 
either generally or in certain events. Whether this will amount strictly to an actual 
reservation or not, will depend on whether, by way of special interpretation, the party 
concerned is really purporting, so far as its own obligations are concerned, to alter the 
substantive content or application of the provision affected; or whether the statement is 
truly interpretational, and merely clarifies some obscurity, or makes explicit something 
that in the clause is only implicit.”64
According to Fitzmaurice, if the statement made by the state, in so far as its 
obligations are concerned with regard to the treaty it has ratified or acceded 
to, alters, or purports to alter, ‘the substantive content or application of the 
provision affected’ then that statement is a reservation. On the other hand, 
however, if, when ratifying or acceding to a treaty, a state makes a statement 
which is ‘truly interpretational, and merely clarifies some obscurity, or makes 
explicit something that in the clause is only implicit’, that statement is an 
interpretative declaration.65 However, recently we have witnessed that the 
distinction drawn by Fitzmaurice is being blurred, and that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to determine whether some statements are reservations 
or interpretative declarations. It has been rightly observed that “[o]ne of the 
64 Fitzmaurice (1957) 203-93, as quoted in Nelson (2001) 771.
65 The United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (Treaty Handbook) defines a declarative interpretation in 
the following terms: ‘interpretative declarations…unlike reservations, do not purport to exclude or 
modify the legal effects of a treaty. The purpose of an interpretative declaration is to clarify the mean-
ing of certain provisions or of the entire treaty.’ See para 3.6.1 at <http://untreaty.un.org/English/
TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm> [accessed 8 March 2008].
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most daunting problems in the law of treaties is the distinction between res-
ervations and interpretative declarations”.66 As Nelson rightly writes:
“As is generally agreed, it is at times extremely difficult to make any distinction between 
an interpretative declaration and a reservation as there is in truth no objective test. ‘An 
interpretative declaration might be regarded by one State as rendering the true meaning 
of a treaty and by another as distorting that meaning’ – hence modifying or excluding the 
legal effect of the relevant provision in its application.”67
Contemporary treaty ratification practice attests to the fact that, like reserva-
tions, many interpretative declarations modify “the extent of the obligations” 
the State undertakes when it ratifies or accedes to a particular treaty.68 This 
has led to the categorisation of interpretative declarations into two categories: 
“mere interpretative declarations” and “qualified interpretative declarations”. 
In the former case the state makes, what one would call, a genuine interpre-
tative declaration, while in the latter case “a State makes a condition of its 
participation in a treaty subject to a particular interpretation of a treaty”.69 
Fitzmaurice has thus observed:
“The latter type of declarations should be viewed as a reservation, since “the declaring 
State is purporting to exclude or to modify the terms of the treaty. Thus the consequences 
attached to the making of reservations should apply to such (a) declaration”. Therefore, 
rules of the Vienna Convention on reservations should apply to qualified interpretative 
declarations.”70
As mentioned earlier, in practice some states make interpretative declarations 
that are interpretative declarations only in name, but reservations in effect.71 
This prompts other states to regard them not as interpretative declarations 
but as reservations and to object to them if they are against the object and 
purpose of the treaty. Thus Kohona observed that an interpretative “decla-
ration attracts an objection because the statement concerned is actually a 
reservation not provided for by the treaty or is inconsistent with its object or 
purpose”.72 Boyle suggests that, where it is difficult to determine whether the 
statement in question amounts to a reservation or an interpretative declara-
tion, it is important to look at the intention “underlying the making of that 
statement”.73
There are instances where some states have made statements which are 
purely political in nature and which one cannot categorise either as reserva-
tions or interpretative declarations. For example, when Iraq ratified CEDAW, 
one of its “reservations” was to the effect that being a State Party to the same 
66 Fitzmaurice (2006) 160.
67 Nelson (fn 64 above) 777.
68 Gardner (1997) 644. 
69 Fitzmaurice (fn 66 above) 160.
70 Fitzmaurice (fn 66 above) 161. Footnotes omitted.
71 It has been illustrated that ‘[i]n the 1988 Belilos case…the [European Court of Human Rights] struck 
down an interpretative declaration concerning Article 6(1) on fair trial that the Swiss government 
had made when depositing its ratification instrument. The Court first interpreted the declaration as 
in fact a reservation and then went on to discard its validity as it was “couched in terms that are too 
vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning or scope”.’ See Koskenniem and 
Leino (2002) 567. 
72 Kohona (2005) 449.
73 Boyle (1980) 504. 
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instrument as Israel did “in no way imply recognition of or entry into any 
relations with Israel”. As expected Israel did not take that “declaration” or 
“reservation” lightly and objected to it by saying that:
“In the view of the Government of the State of Israel, such declaration which is explicitly 
of a political character is incompatible with the purposes and objectives of the Conven-
tion and cannot in any way affect whatever obligations are binding upon Iraq under 
general international law or under particular conventions. The Government of the State 
of Israel will, in so far as concerns the substance of the matter, adopt towards Iraq an 
attitude of complete reciprocity.”74
The foregoing discussion is relevant to South Africa in the following three 
ways: an interpretative declaration should only and only clarify the meaning 
South Africa attributes to an obscure word in the treaty provision or the treaty 
provision itself. In other words, should South Africa attempt to couch a res-
ervation as an interpretative declaration, other states parties to the treaty will 
treat it as a reservation and object to it. Two, like a reservation, an interpreta-
tive declaration should not defeat the object and purport of the treaty. And 
lastly, South African should not enter “political” interpretative declarations.
5 SOUTH AFRICA RATIFYING THE PROTOCOL
The Instrument of Ratification of the Protocol which was signed by the South 
African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini Zuma, on 
17 December 2004 and deposited with the Secretariat of the African Union 
on 14 January 2005 provides in the preamble that “…ratification of the 
Protocol was approved by the South African Parliament in accordance with 
the requirements of South African law, subject to…reservations and declara-
tive interpretations”. We now turn to a discussion of those reservations and 
declarative interpretations.
5.1 Reservations
South Africa reserved to Article 4(2)(j) of the Protocol which obliges States 
parties that still impose the death penalty to take appropriate and effective 
measures to ensure that the death penalty is not carried out on pregnant or 
nursing women. South Africa entered the following reservation:
“Article 4[2](j)75 of the Protocol does not find application in the Republic of South Africa 
as the death penalty has been abolished. Inasmuch as the existence of Article 4[2](j) may 
be construed to be an inadvertent sanctioning of the death penalty in other States Par-
ties, this may conflict with section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996). South Africa is in principle opposed to the application of the 
death penalty and no adverse legal consequences, including any conflict with section 2 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, may be visited upon the Parliament 
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa pertaining to the ratification of the 
Protocol.”
The Constitution protects the right to life under section 11 by providing that 
“everyone has the right to life.” Unlike in some African countries where the 
74 See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 11 March 2008].
75 The Instrument of Ratification omits subsection 2, and only refers to Article 4(j). This was a mistake, 
as the reference should have been Article 4(2)(j).
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right to life is qualified,76 the right to life under the South African Constitution 
is not qualified. The Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane77 held that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional because it, amongst other things, violated 
the right to life, and was a cruel and inhumane punishment. It is upon that 
basis that the ratification instrument clearly points out that Article 4(2)(j) of 
the Protocol does not have application in South Africa because the death 
penalty has been abolished there. One has to recall that the reservation refers 
to section 2 of the Constitution. Section 2 provides: “the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”.
Section 2 should be viewed in the light of the above reservation, where the 
instrument of ratification states that “inasmuch as the existence of Article 4[2]
(j) may be construed to be an inadvertent sanctioning of the death penalty 
in other States Parties, this may conflict with section 2 of the Constitution…” 
This reservation at least has two implications: the first implication is that 
South Africa cannot enact a law that sanctions the imposition of a death 
penalty even if the Protocol allows the imposition of such a penalty, because 
such law would be in conflict with section 2 of the Constitution; the second 
and most important implication is, that South Africa cannot conduct itself in 
a manner that would allow or facilitate the imposition of a death penalty on 
any person, because such conduct would be in violation of the Constitution. 
For example, South Africa cannot extradite or deport a person to a country 
where there is the likelihood that such person may be sentenced to death 
when convicted of the offence for which he has been deported or extradited.78 
The reservation to Article 4(2)(j) makes it clear that “South Africa is in princi-
ple opposed to the death penalty…”
South Africa also made a reservation to Article 6(d). This Article states: 
“States Parties shall ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and are 
regarded as equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national 
legislative measures to guarantee that: every marriage shall be recorded in 
writing and registered in accordance with national laws, in order to be legally 
recognised”.
“The Republic of South Africa makes a reservation and will consequently not consider 
itself bound to the requirements contained in article 6(d) that a marriage shall be recorded 
in writing and registered in accordance with national laws in order to be legally recog-
nised. This reservation is made in view of the provision of section 4(9) of the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act No. 120 of 1998), which stipulates that failure to 
register a customary marriage does not affect the validity of that marriage, and is consid-
ered to be a protection for women married under customary law.”
76 For example, the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides that ‘no person shall be deprived of life 
intentionally except in execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial…’ (article 22(1)); see also article 
12(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (as amended in 2005); article 12(1) of the Constitution of 
Zambia (as amended in 1996); and article 14(1) of the Constitution of Mauritius.
77 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
78 For a detailed discussion of South Africa’s jurisprudence relating to deportation where a deportee 
may be sentenced to death, see De Wet (above) 1529 -1559. 
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Unlike the reservation to the death penalty (Article 4(2)(j)) which is based on 
the Constitution which is the supreme law of the land, the reservation to Article 
6(d) is based on the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA). However, 
both reservations have the same force under international law notwithstanding 
the fact that one is based on the Constitution and the other on a piece of legisla-
tion subordinate to the Constitution. When commenting on section 4(9) of the 
RCMA, Jansen rightly observes that “[a]lthough the Act provides for registration 
this is not a requirement for a valid customary marriage”.79 It is vital to note that 
South Africa does not merely say that it is making a reservation to Article 6(d) 
in the light of its domestic legislation. It also explains why such reservation is 
important, viz, it “is considered to be a protection for women married under 
customary law”. Such justification is important because if any other State Party 
wanted to object to South Africa’s reservation in this regard, it may find it a 
challenge to make a convincing objection. For example, any objection to South 
Africa’s reservation would have to show that the reservation perpetuates the 
subordination of women. South Africa’s reservation also shows that it did not 
reserve on article 6(h) just for the sake of reserving but to genuinely protect the 
rights and interests of women married under customary law.
However, it could be argued that the above justifications South Africa gave 
in reserving to Article 6(d) are indefensible in the light of the following two 
reasons. In the first place, Article 27 of the VCLT prohibits a state from invok-
ing its domestic law to defeat its international obligation. One could argue 
that South Africa by invoking its domestic law, section 4(9) of the RCMA, is 
defeating its international obligation under Article 6(d) of the Protocol.
Secondly and most importantly, Viljoen argues that “the non –registration of 
marriages facilitates the marriage of girl-children, and therefore strikes at a core 
provision of the Protocol”.80 It is argued that this is true when one only looks at 
section 3(1)(a)(i-ii) of the RCMA which requires that for any customary marriage 
entered into after the coming into force of the Act to be valid, “the prospective 
spouses must both be above the age of 18 years; and must both consent to 
be married to each other under customary law”. However, it is submitted that 
the registration of customary marriages in itself does not prevent the marriage 
of girl-children. This is because the RCMA provides in 3(3)(1)(a) that “for a 
customary marriage entered into after the commencement of this Act to be valid, 
if either of the prospective spouses is a minor, both his or her parents, or if he or 
she has no parents, his or legal guardian must consent to the marriage”.
Section 4(a) buttresses my argument by providing that “[d]espite [section 
3](1)(a)(i)], the Minister or any officer in the public service authorised in 
writing thereto by him or her, may grant written permission to a person under 
the age of 18 years to enter into a customary marriage if the Minister or 
the said officer considers such marriage desirable and in the interests of the 
parties in question”. Under section 4, every customary marriage, including 
79 Bekker, Rautenbach and Goolam (2006) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 41. Foot-
notes omitted. 
80 Viljoen (2007) 273.
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those where the wife is below the age of 18 provided the legal requirements 
were met, has to be registered even though failure to register it does not affect 
its validity. One also has to recall that the Children’s Act81 which came into 
force in July 2007, though under section 1 defines a child to mean a person 
under the age of 18 years and sets 18 years as the age of majority (section 17), 
provides under section 12(2) that “[a] child below the minimum age set by 
law for a valid marriage may not be given out in a marriage or engagement”. 
However, sections 31 read together with section 18(3)(c) provide that any 
parent or guardian of the child may give or refuse any consent required by 
law in respect of the child in including consent to the child’s marriage. Thus 
the registration of customary marriages in itself does not prevent the marriage 
of girl-children. However, it could be argued that such laws are in violation 
of South Africa’s international obligations because under the Protocol and 
CEDAW, girls should only get married when they reach the age of 18 years.82 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child83 also requires 
states to take “effective action” including enacting appropriate legislation 
specifying “the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years…”84
One positive and undeniable aspect of South Africa’s reservation to article 
6(d) is that when one looks at the various provisions of the RCMA in the light 
of the status of women in customary marriages in South Africa in the past, 
the RCMA is indeed meant to protect women in such marriages. As Samuel 
observes, before the enactment of the RCMA, women in customary marriages 
were “in a position of perpetual minors, passing from the guardianship of their 
fathers to that of their husbands”.85 They had no locus standi and their con-
tractual capacity was limited, men owned and controlled household property, 
and that it was “more difficult for women than men to obtain a divorce.”86 If a 
man was prepared to forfeit the bride wealth, he could “unilaterally repudiate 
his wife” but the wife could not unilaterally repudiate her husband and where 
grounds of divorce existed, she could not initiate the process.87 A woman who 
sought a divorce had to “enlist the help of the bridewealth holder who [might] 
well be reluctant to co-operate for fear of having to return at least part of the 
bridewealth”.88
Samuels succinctly captures the “overriding object” of the Act as “to amel-
iorate the inconsistencies in South African family law which relegated women 
to second class citizens or even worse, women with no status at all”.89 As 
mentioned earlier, the Act provides under section 4(9) that the non-registration 
of a customary marriage does not affect its validity. This has various positive 
81 Act 38 of 2005.
82 Viljoen (fn 80 above) at 273.
83 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). Adopted 
in July 1990 and entered into force 29 November 1999. South Africa acceded to this treaty on 1 July 
2000. 
84 Article 21(2).
85 Samuel (1999) 25. 
86 Samuel (fn 85 above) at 25.
87 Samuel (fn 85 above) at 25.
88 Samuel (fn 85 above) at 25.
89 Samuel (fn 85 above ) at 25.
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consequences. First, a wife in a customary marriage, whether registered or not, 
“has full status and capacity, including the capacity to acquire assets and to 
dispose of them, to enter into contracts and to litigate, in addition to any other 
rights and powers that she might have at customary law”.90 Secondly, section 
7 makes a customary marriage contracted after the commencement of the Act 
a marriage in community of property and loss between the spouses unless 
the spouses in their antenuptial contracts excluded such consequences. And 
thirdly, under section 8 a customary marriage may only be dissolved by court on 
the ground that either party proves the existence of “irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage”. The above provisions show that women in customary marriages, 
whether registered or not, are equal with men, can own property and can decide 
to seek a divorce if they think that a marriage has irretrievably broken down.
A reservation was also entered to Article 6(h) which provides: “States Par-
ties shall ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and are regarded as 
equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national legislative 
measures to guarantee that: a woman and a man shall have equal rights, with 
respect to the nationality of their children except where this is contrary to a 
provision in national legislation or is contrary to national security interests”.
“The Republic of South Africa makes reservation to Article 6(h), which subjugates the 
equal rights of men and women with respect to the nationality of their children to national 
legislation and national security interests, on the basis that it may remove inherent rights 
of citizenship and nationality from children.”
Unlike the previous two reservations already considered, this reservation to 
Article 6(h) is expressly based neither on the Constitution nor on a piece of 
legislation. However, like the other two reservations, it also gives its rationale, 
that is, that it protects the inherent rights to citizenship and nationality of 
children. It has to be recalled that in countries like Egypt in the case of mar-
riages between aliens and Egyptians, they must take the father’s nationality, 
always. It is considered to be prejudicial to the child’s future if he acquired the 
mother’s nationality. Authorities in that country hold the view that where the 
mother is, for example, an Egyptian and the father a South African, the child 
has to be a South African citizen “since it is customary for a woman to agree, 
upon marrying an alien, that her children shall be of the father’s nationality”.91 
If South Africa enacted a law that denied South African nationality or citizen-
ship to children born of South African fathers but alien mothers for security 
interests, as the Protocol provides in article 6(h), it would mean that children 
born of South African fathers but Egyptian mothers would become stateless 
as they would be neither South African nationals nor Egyptian nationals. The 
reservation to Article 6(h) should be viewed in that context.
5.2 Interpretative declarations
South Africa made an interpretative declaration to Article 1 (f) which defines 
discrimination against women to mean “any distinction, exclusion or restric-
90 Section 6.
91 See Egypt’s reservation to Article 9 of CEDAW at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.
htm> [accessed 10 March 2008].
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tion or any differential treatment based on sex and whose objectives or effects 
compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women, 
regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in all spheres of life”. The declaration reads:
“It is understood that the definition of “discrimination against women” in the Protocol 
has the same meaning and scope as is provided for in section 9 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996), as interpreted by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa from time to time.”
This is probably one of the most unclear of interpretative declarations. It could 
be likened to the well known “Sharia declarations/reservations” by which 
Islamic countries vaguely state when ratifying treaties that a particular word or 
phrase in a treaty shall be given the meaning that is in line with the Sharia law.92 
Unlike its reservations, where South Africa at least paraphrases the relevant 
national law upon which a reservation is based, in this case one has a double 
task interpreting it. In the first place, one has to read section 9 of the Consti-
tution93 and understand what it means by “discrimination against women”. 
In addition, one is also required to read the judgments of the Constitutional 
Court that have interpreted section 9 with regard to discrimination against 
women. Judgments rendered by other courts, and in particular the High Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal, on their understanding of section 9 and 
how they relates to discrimination against women are irrelevant, unless they 
have been upheld by the Constitutional Court. Thus, Cameroonian, Egyptian, 
Malian or Ugandan researchers who want to understand what “discrimination 
against women” means in South Africa in relation to the Protocol are required 
to familiarise themselves with section 9 of the Constitution and the relevant 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court “from time to time”.
Despite the fact that researchers who are not familiar with the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court equality jurisprudence may find it a daunting task to 
establish what the Court has ruled on the meaning of discrimination against 
women in the context of the South African Constitution, it should be recalled 
that there are several ground-breaking judgments in which the Court has 
declared laws or customs to be unconstitutional for discriminating against 
women. Such judgments have indeed reflected that the Court has furthered 
not only the object and purport of section 9 of the Constitution, but also that 
of the Protocol. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail all or 
most of the cases in which the Court has upheld the unconstitutionality of laws 
that discriminated against women, however, two cases are highlighted. In Bhe 
and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and others94 the Constitutional Court held 
that the relevant sections of the Black Administration Act95 and the Intestate 
92 For example Saudi Arabia made the following reservation when ratifying CEDAW: “In case of con-
tradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not 
under obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention.” See <http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm> [accessed 10 March 2008].
93 See also Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000.
94 2005 (1) SA 580.
95 Act 38 of 1927.
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Succession Act96 were unconstitutional because, inter alia, they furthered cul-
tural practices which prohibited women from being heirs of the estates of their 
fathers who had died interstate. In Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa97 the 
Court held that tribal chiefs had the power to develop customary law to allow 
the appointment of a woman as a tribal chief on the ground that a customary 
practice which prohibited women from being chiefs was discriminatory and 
contrary to the Constitution. The Court also held that “[i]f women are to be 
Chiefs, the practice that a [Chief] always has to be fathered by the previous 
[Chief] must necessarily change”.98 The above rulings are in consonant with 
the Protocol which requires South Africa to outlaw all customs and laws that 
perpetuate discrimination against women.99 However, it is regrettable that in 
none of the above cases did the Court refer to the Protocol to buttress its find-
ings that the principle of non-discrimination against women is also entrenched 
under international treaties to which South Africa is a party.
South Africa also made a declarative interpretation to Article 31. Article 31 
provides that “none of the provisions of the present Protocol shall affect more 
favourable provisions for the realisation of the rights of women contained in 
the national legislation of States Parties or in any other regional, continental 
or international conventions, treaties or agreements applicable in these States 
Parties”. The declaration reads:
“It is understood that the provisions contained in article 31 may result in an interpretation 
that the level of protection afforded by the South African Bill of Rights is less favourable 
than the level of protection offered by the Protocol, as the Protocol contains no express 
limitations to the rights contained therein, while the South African Bill of Rights does 
inherently provide for the potential limitations of rights under certain circumstances. The 
South African Bill of Rights should not be interpreted to offer less favourable protection of 
human rights than the Protocol, which does not expressly provide for such limitations.”
Article 31 contemplates that there may be situations where national legislation 
could contain more favourable provisions for the realisation and protection 
of women’s rights than the Protocol itself. In such cases, such national leg-
islation should be encouraged. South Africa was concerned that because the 
Protocol does not contain express limitation clauses, it could be assumed that 
it offered more favourable protection than the Constitution which did contain 
such limitations. By making an interpretative declaration to Article 31, South 
Africa clarified that its Bill of Rights offered more favourable protection to South 
African women than the Protocol. One finds it more compelling to agree with 
the South African position for at least three reasons. First of all, it is easier for 
women in South Africa to petition the South African courts for the protection 
of their rights under the Bill of Rights than would be the case with the Proto-
col. Many of them may not even be aware that the Protocol exists, and even 
those who are aware of its existence are required to exhaust domestic remedies 
96 Act 81 of 1987.
97 [2008] ZACC 9.
98 Shilubana and others v Nwamitwa [2008] ZACC 9, para 79.
99 See Article 2. In Daniels v Campbell and others 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) the Constitutional Court found 
the relevant provisions of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and the Maintenance of Surviv-
ing Spouses Act 27 of 1990 to be unconstitutional for discriminating against widows see above in 
monogamous Muslim marriages. 
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before approaching the Protocol’s enforcement body. Secondly, South African 
courts and human rights activists are more likely to be better conversant with 
the South African Bill of Rights than with the Protocol, and thus, if there are 
violations of women’s rights, their first source of reference will be the Constitu-
tion. Lastly, the enforcement mechanism of international judgments depends 
largely on the goodwill of the state concerned, and many states respect such 
judgments because they do not want to be named and shamed as ones that 
do not respect their treaty obligations. However, national courts’ judgments 
are always easier to enforce as relevant government officials may be taken to 
court for contempt if they disrespected a court order without justification. It 
is thus easier to seek a local remedy by relying on the Bill of Rights, than an 
international remedy relying on the Protocol.100
6 CONCLUSION
The article has dealt with the meaning of reservations and interpretative declara-
tions in the light of the Protocol. The drafting history of the Protocol has been 
discussed. The article has also addressed the distinction between reservations 
and interpretative declarations. It has been show that, while it may sometimes be 
difficult to draw this distinction, it is possible to do so. The status and importance 
of international law in South African jurisprudence has been dealt with, and it 
has been demonstrated that courts in South Africa resort to international law to 
interpret the Bill of Rights, as required by the Constitution. The legal implica-
tions of the reservations and interpretative declarations that South Africa made 
when ratifying the Protocol have been discussed. The author has illustrated that 
whereas all the reservations South Africa made to the Protocol are clear, this is 
not the case with one interpretative declaration to Article 1(f) of the Protocol that 
defines “discrimination against women”. The interpretative declaration is to the 
effect that South Africa understands “discrimination against women” to mean 
the interpretation given to that term under section 9 of the Constitution and 
how it is interpreted by the Constitutional Court from time to time. The author 
accordingly argues that this is an ambiguous interpretative declaration.
It is submitted that much as South Africa’s reservation to Article 6(d) of the 
Protocol is meant to protect women in customary marriages, South Africa, 
as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recommended in 
2005,101 should in the not far distant future consider withdrawing that reservation 
because it clearly furthers a practice (of the marriage of minors) which is contrary 
100 For circumstances under which a state or provincial official can be convicted of contempt of court 
see Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and another [2003] 2 All SA 223 
(SCA). On the same subject matter see also Kate v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape [2005] 1All SA 745 
(SE).
101 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recommended that South Africa should 
consider “lifting the reservation made on Article 6(d) of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the rights of women in Africa.” See Concluding Observations and 
Recommendations on the First Periodic Report of the Republic of South Africa, made at the 38th 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 21 November – 5 
December 2005, Banjul, The Gambia at <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/countries/docs/conclud-
ing%20observations%20-%20south%20african%20periodic%20report%20-%20update%20and%20
%20adopted.doc> [accessed 19 July 2008].
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to its international obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the Protocol, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
and CEDAW. South Africa should also consider revising its domestic laws to 
expressly prohibit the marriage of minors. The reservations and interpretative 
declarations discussed above, apart from the one on Article 6(d) in some respects 
as highlighted above, are reflective of South Africa’s commitment not only to pro-
tecting the rights under its Bill of Rights but also under the relevant international 
treaties it is party to. These rights include the right to life, the right to equality 
between men and women during marriage especially customary marriages, and 
the rights of children in relation to the nationality of both their parents.
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